We study the eect of dierent types of barriers to innovation (nancial, demand, knowledge, market, cooperation, and regulatory barriers) on rm level innovation inputs and outputs. Using a pooled sample of three Chilean innovation surveys, based on an instrumental variables approach, we nd that the probability of generating innovation outcomes is signicantly reduced by demand and nancial barriers. Regarding inputs for innovation, we nd a clear negative relationship between nancial and demand obstacles and the propensity to incur (non-R&D) innovation expenditures, but not with its intensity. We also provide evidence of heterogeneous eects across sectors, nding that knowledge obstacles are relevant for manufacturing and market structure obstacles for services, while demand and nancial obstacles appear to matter across the board.
Introduction
Several micro-level studies have found that innovation has a positive impact on productivity at the rm level (see for example Janz et al., 2003; Mansury and Love, 2008; Crespi et al., 2017) . Innovation could thus be the key to overcome the problem of stagnant productivity levels that has become one of Latin America's most pressing challenges for development (Pagés, 2010; Grazzi et al., 2016) . Stagnant productivity has been a reality both in countries with a low growth record and countries with better outcomes, such as Mexico or Chile, and more recently Colombia and Peru. These economies have enacted, some for many years, active innovation policies with the goal of addressing market failures and expanding productivity at the rm, sector and country levels. However, despite these increasing eorts, both nancial and institutional, rates of innovation and productivity levels have remained low.
What could be stopping rms from innovating more? It could be that the scale of government support is still relatively low in the presence of multiple market failures. But it could also be the result of a lack of understanding, and thus ineective addressing, of the barriers rms face to innovate. In order to answer this question from an empirical perspective, we need to analyze data and assess the impact of obstacles on innovation. Despite the fact that surveys have asked questions about obstacles for innovation for more than twenty years in several countries, the analysis of their impact on innovation activity is relatively recent, partly due to the fact that surveys tend to show a positive correlation between innovation and obstacles. Recent literature has addressed this issue by restricting the sample analyzed to rms interested in innovating (Savignac, 2008; D'Este et al., 2012) . However, most analyses have focused on the role of nancial obstacles (e.g. Savignac, 2008 or Álvarez and Crespi, 2015, for Chile) , which is the most obvious obstacle that emerges from a market-failure understanding of innovative activity. Only very recently the relative role of dierent obstacles has emerged, partly motivated by the broader set of issues considered by the systems/evolutionary approach to innovation policy. 1 For example, the systems approach to innovation emphasizes interactions and technological capabilities related to cooperation and knowledge barriers, which are not issues that follow directly from thinking about market failures.
In this paper we build upon this literature to explore the eect of innovation obstacles on a range of innovation inputs and outputs at the rm level for the case of Chile. We analyze innovation and R&D expenditure as inputs. As for outcomes, we look at dummies for innovation, technological (product and process) innovation, and non-technological (market and organizational) innovation. Chilean data has the advantage of the quality associated to the accumulated experience, as the country has undertaken 10 rounds of innovation surveys. These surveys include questions about dierent barriers to innovation, and analyze most economic sectors. In this study we use the three latest available rounds (7th, 8th and 9th innovation surveys). Although they are not panel surveys, it is possible to connect triads of surveys to build a panel, which we use for our analysis.
Our work expands the literature in three ways. First, we disaggregate what are usually grouped together as market obstacles into two categories: demand and market structure obstacles, which we argue capture dierent dimensions of innovation barriers (lack or uncertainty of demand for new products on the one hand, and a market dominated by a few established rms on the other, which is more related to traditional barriers to entry). Second, we decompose the data to analyze the dierential impact of dierent obstacles across dierent sectors and rm types to provide a more detailed analysis of heterogeneous eects. Third, we implement alternative econometric strategies, including an instrumental variables approach and xed eects 1 See for instance Pellegrino and Savona (2017) , Coad et al. (2016) , and the early contribution by Galia and Legros (2004). estimations, to make a stronger case on the causality of our results.
Our results consistently show that, together with nancial constraints, demand obstacles are the most important barriers rms face to innovate. Our instrumental variables estimates indicate that facing demand constraints lowers the probability of innovating by between 15 and 28 percentage points, depending on the instrument used, and nancial obstacles lower it between 17 and 23 percentage points. The eect of demand and nancial barriers on the propensity to spend on (non-R&D) innovation activities is 13 and 15 percentage points, respectively. Considering potentially innovative rms, 2 these coecients imply that nancial and demand barriers on their own roughly halve the propensities to innovate or to spend on innovation, an economically signicant eect. The rest of the obstacles appear to be irrelevant for the whole sample for instrumental variables and xed-eects estimates. This is consistent with ndings by Galia et al. (2012) and Pellegrino and Savona (2017) .
We also analyze sectoral subsamples to understand if there are heterogeneous eects and if our results are explained by some sectors in particular. We nd that demand and nancial obstacles are relevant across the board, albeit with heterogeneous magnitudes, and other barriers appear to be sector-specic. Manufacturing is the only sector where knowledge obstacles are relevant, and market structure obstacles, which are signicant for the regular regressions for the whole sample, appear only relevant for the services sector. We obtain similar results for innovation inputs. We also nd that the coecients for the mining sector are particularly high.
We complement this analysis with qualitative research based on in-depth interviews with rms' managers (see Zahler et al., 2019) , which we use to corroborate the main ndings and to dig deeper in their interpretation, in particular regarding possible hypotheses on what could be driving demand obstacles, and mechanisms used to ease barriers. The qualitative analysis performed conrms the importance of bothnancial and particularly demand obstacles. Firms usually required internal or external (usually government) nancial support to engage in innovation activities. However, they consistently declared that the most binding constraint, once nance was not a huge issue, was nding buyers for their new products. Most of the rms interviewed were suppliers of goods and services for other rms, so our insights on demand barriers apply to this group. 3 Most current and potential clients are very conservative in their buying decisions. This seems to be particularly marked in the mining sector. Also, when collaboration with customers was required to develop a new product or lower the risk of the innovative process, they were usually unwilling to share this risk, and preferred waiting until the leaders of the respective industry tried the product. Managers interviewed interpreted this lack of demand as coming mostly from a strong preference for low-risk and short-run results. The interviews also motivated us to separate demand obstacles from market structure obstacles, as explained before.
As part of this qualitative analysis we found that nancial obstacles, although ubiquitous, were not very dicult to resolve. However, demand obstacles were the nal and most dicult hurdle for successful innovation. Motivated by this recurrent fact, we also test in this paper whether the key obstacles (demand and nancial) are binding in preventing innovation. We test if rms with no nancial (or demand) obstacles face the highlighted demand (or nancial) obstacles more, or other obstacles appear relevant. We nd that when rms do not face one of these obstacles, the rest of the obstacles expand their relevance, particularly the other key obstacle (nance when demand is absent and vice versa). However, when the demand or nancial obstacle is present, the relevance of other obstacles is reduced or disappears, including the other key obstacle. This suggests that, when active, each of them dominate the diculties faced by rms that attempt to innovate.
The paper builds on several strands of related literature on economics of innovation at the rm level. First, it is part of the extensive empirical literature on determinants of innovation, which uses innovation surveys.
There is a vast amount of research done for developed and developing economies seeking to understand the determinants of innovation activity and its eect on rm level outcomes. Relevant examples of this are Crespi and Zuniga (2012) ; Grith et al. (2006) ; Benavente (2006); Zahler et al. (2014) ; Álvarez et al. (2010) .
Specically we complement the empirical papers that analyze characteristics and conditions that inhibit or negatively aect rm level innovation activity. As mentioned earlier, this latter literature is recent, because innovation surveys gave counterintuitive relations between obstacles and innovation. This puzzle was resolved by Savignac (2008) and D'Este et al. (2008) by restricting survey samples to potentially innovative rms, where the declaration of obstacles eectively reected actual challenges to pursue innovation. We use their same procedure to eliminate selection bias, and show that it exists. Papers have then analyzed mostly the role of nancial obstacles. For Chile, Álvarez and Crespi (2015) use data from 2007 and study the role of nancial constraints. They nd a signicant negative eect of nancial obstacles on innovation output. They also disaggregate by sector. Crespi et al. (2016) use data from 2009 to explore whether dierent groups of barriers to innovation have a dierent relationship with innovation, however only for the services sector.
We will build on those studies methodologically, using instrumental variables and xed eects, expanding their application in the dimensions previously mentioned. Álvarez and Crespi (2015) and Pellegrino and Savona (2017) are the closest to our paper, since they correspondingly analyze obstacles in Chile and compare the relevance of dierent categories of obstacles. We expand the analysis in Álvarez and Crespi (2015) to all possible barriers. We analyze obstacles in a very similar logic to Pellegrino and Savona (2017) , however, we provide a dierent denition of our most important object of analysis: demand obstacles. Additionally, we use instrumental variables strategies and panel data to
give a causal explanation of our results, and we provide an in-depth analysis of the potential heterogeneity of these eects. Although with a dierent denition, we nd similar relevance of demand obstacles as Pellegrino and Savona (2017) . Our work is also related to recent work, mostly in developed economies, that analyzes demand obstacles, and the relation between dierent obstacles and innovation. García-Quevedo et al. (2016) establish that one of the main problems in undertaking R&D is the interest of clients for potential new products (lack of demand). They also identify lack of demand and demand uncertainty as two distinct issues (we analyze them together, though, as demand side obstacles). Also, even though we do not test for complementarities among obstacles, we analyze obstacles in the presence and absence of particular ones. Galia and Legros (2004) do this more formally, studying the complementarities of obstacles on innovation, analyzing how they aect the probability of postponing or abandoning innovation projects. We build on their logic to analyze the relations between the pervasive obstacles and the rest of them.
Finally, we base our construction of instrumental variables on the strategy used by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Chun and Mun (2012) . They use industry averages of sources of information to innovate as instruments of individual values of these sources, since they tend to be simultaneous with their variable of interest: cooperation for innovation. We face a similar problem in our analysis, and thus we also use averages, albeit at a dierent level of aggregation and for a dierent variable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the database and the main variables of analysis.
4 A similar result is found by Savignac (2008) and Mohnen et al. (2008) . Section 3 provides descriptive statistics that motivate the problems analyzed and the econometric analysis.
Section 4 shows the econometric methodology used and the main results of the paper, as well as robustness checks using a small panel. In this section we also provide an heterogeneity analysis and test the relationships between key obstacles (demand and nancial) and other obstacles in preventing innovation. Section 5 discusses our results in light of the qualitative analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our ndings and discusses policy implications.
Data and denition of variables
Our main source of data is the Innovation Survey carried every two years by the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE) and the Chilean Ministry of Economy. Ten rounds have been undertaken, covering the period 1994-2014. We use the 7th, 8th and 9th rounds of the innovation survey to expand the sample size as much as possible while keeping methodological consistency, specically regarding the denition of innovation obstacles 5 . Table 1 provides a basic description of each of these surveys.
We were also able to build a panel from the 7th, 8th and 9th surveys, as we were able to obtain a set of identiers from INE for the set of rms that were surveyed in these waves. We use this panel to support our main ndings through the use of rm level xed eects. The sample is small (a balanced panel of 769 rms) and is biased towards larger rms. The reason for this is that the surveys were not intended to be used as panel data. The Chilean innovation surveys use a dierent random sample for each wave, but nevertheless, some rms are repeated across surveys, either because they belong to sectors or groups where all rms are forced to be surveyed (mining, utilities, rms with over 2% of a sector's sales), or by pure chance. Table 2 shows basic characteristics of the panel as well as the full pooled sample as comparison in the same table.
Denition of barriers
The list of barriers to innovation had changes during the older waves of the innovation survey, but it remained constant over the surveys that we use (waves 7 through 9). When rms are surveyed, a list of barriers to innovative activity is presented, allowing respondents to indicate as many barriers as they believe are relevant on a scale of 1 (non-important) to 4 (very important). We group these barriers under dierent categories and, for the sake of this paper, we consider that a barrier category is present if a rm declared that any of the barriers under that category had a high importance. Table 3 shows each obstacle as it appears on the survey, the category in which it was listed in the survey and the category under which it is classied 5 The 10th round was not ready when we did our research. Comparing categories in the survey with our paper, we recategorized obstacle 7 as cooperation since it clearly asks a question on this aspect of innovation. We also created dierent market structure and demand categories, leaving only obstacle 8 as a market structure obstacle, and categorizing obstacles 9
and 10 as demand obstacles. We made this distinction because we consider the underlying questions to aim at two fundamentally dierent issues: the question that we classify as a market barrier is related to market structure and dominance, while the questions that we classify as demand barriers indicate a perceived important commercialization risk related to demand uncertainty or lack of demand. Although both categories are related, we believe they reect dierent issues aecting innovation decisions. Market structure obstacles are related to the fact that there is low competition and high barriers to entry, but they are not driven by demand, but by competitors. Demand obstacles on the other hand are directly related to the risk of not nding buyers or the uncertainty about it. We were motivated to make this dierentiation based on the ndings of our qualitative analysis. When interpreting the results, we stress that demand does not necessarily refer to nal consumers. Many of the rms surveyed are intermediate suppliers, and our interviews suggest that it is other rm's as buyers that are associated with feeble demand for innovation, although unfortunately we have no data that would enable us to dig deeper into this issue. 6 , 7 Obstacle 11 was categorized as regulation since it is the only (unfortunately not very accurate) question that asks directly about regulatory issues generating problems for innovation. Finally, we excluded obstacle 12 from the analysis. We do not consider it a real obstacle to innovation, given the way it is asked ( no need due to 6 We dier in this aspect from Pellegrino and Savona (2017) and others who consider market and demand factors as a unique demand category. We dier also from García-Quevedo et al. (2016) , who look at demand level and demand uncertainty as dierent barriers (and consider all other barriers only as an additional control).
7 A small fraction of rms declared a high importance of the obstacle no need due to lack of demand and at the same time innovated, which might reect a contradiction since the obstacle is dened as innovation not being necessary. We kept this question in the analysis since it might reect a timing issue (they may have innovated in the rst year covered by the survey, and at the time of answering consider that there is no further need). Savignac (2008) , one of the reasons why the analysis of barriers was not developed before in the innovation empirical literature was because using the full sample produced counterintuitive results. They show that using a sample of rms that intend to innovate, this counterintuitive result was reversed and it was possible to assess in a better way the role of obstacles. Firms that made an eort to innovate or appear to declare some interest in the topic by declaring the existence of obstacles, be it that they innovated or not, are included in the estimations. Following this logic we will dene a subsample of potentially innovative rms as those that fulll at least one of the following requirements:
• They innovated in product or process.
• They spent money on activities related to innovation (R&D, 9 machinery, training, licensing, etc.).
• They declared at least one barrier as of high importance.
With these conditions, Table 4 shows how the full sample changes to a potentially innovative rm sample.
We exclude 3,375 observations as non-innovative rms. Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for potentially innovative and non-potentially innovative rms. A simple comparison of potentially innovative rms with the rest of the sample does not reveal important dierences, something we did not expect. Both groups have similar rm size (although slightly larger for the potentially innovative group, in employees), slightly higher proportion of exporting rms and similar rm age. These rm characteristics will be used as controls in our econometric analysis.
8 We checked including this barrier as a new category in the regressions, and there were no relevant changes in the parameter estimates.
9 Either internal or external. We rst provide descriptive statistics regarding the main variables of interest: obstacles and some innovation outputs. Table 6 provides a rst overview of the main variables, disaggregated at a 1 digit level. We show means and standard deviation across sectoral categories. When we disaggregate by sector we observe an important heterogeneity, both in the rate of innovation and the percentage of rms declaring obstacles.
For each column, we colored in blue the 3 sectors with the highest propensities to innovate and the lowest perception of each obstacle, and in red the 3 sectors that are in the opposite end. Looking columnwise, we observe that the sectoral highest levels of innovation more than double the lowest levels. Mining (C), utilities (E) and manufacturing (D) are the most innovative, whereas transport, storage and communications (I), shing (B), and wholesale and retail trade (G) are the least. This heterogeneity is also present in obstacles.
Sectors with high perception of obstacles more than double those with low average perception. Second, some obstacles are more ubiquitous than others. Financial obstacles are the most declared by far (50% on average across sectors). Knowledge, demand and market barriers are also common. 10 Regulation is the least mentioned barrier. When looking across sectors, some interesting patterns arise. Some sectors appear to be less constrained to innovation for most barriers and others more constrained. The table shows that mining has consistently a relatively low declaration of obstacles. Something similar happens with electricity, gas and water companies (utilities). This also coincides with the fact that these companies tend to be large and permanently included in the innovation survey. These two sectors are among those with the highest propensities to innovate. Sector J (nancial intermediation) also tends to have lower propensity to declare obstacles across the dierent categories, however, it is not across those with more innovation. On the contrary, shing (B), construction (F) and retail (G) tend to show higher propensities to declare barriers across categories. This motivates us to investigate sectoral heterogeneity in our estimations. Table 7 shows the correlation between dierent barriers. All of them are positively correlated, although 10 Financial, knowledge and demand obstacles include two or more questions. 4 Econometric analysis
Estimation strategies
Our base set of specications are linear regressions over the pooled cross section of innovation surveys (waves seven to nine). With this strategy we take advantage of a relatively large dataset as well as detailed and homogeneous questions on innovation inputs, outputs, obstacles and several covariates. The obvious disadvantage is that there is no simple way to control for the endogeneity of the measures of obstacles. The case for endogeneity is based on the argument that rms that innovate have more information on what obstacles they face. Also, rms that innovated probably had to overcome dierent obstacles and this might aect the perception they have of them.
To tackle endogeneity we employ an instrumental variables approach. We instrument each barrier category at the rm level using sector-region-period averages of the same obstacle. We use a similar strategy to that of Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) and Chun and Mun (2012) , as we explain below in section 4.3.
As a complementary methodology, we use a balanced panel we built using the 7th, 8th and 9th surveys.
The panel nature of the data allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. constant unobserved rm characteristics), dealing with an important degree of the endogeneity that is present in the pooled cross sections used in much of this literature.
As previously explained, we restrict the sample used in our estimations to potentially innovative rms.
We dene these as those that i) declared technological innovations during the period; or ii) incurred any expenditure on R&D (whether internal or external) or innovation-related activities; or iii) faced at least one barrier with high intensity 11 . As explained by D'Este et al. (2012) and Savignac (2008) , the reason for this restriction is that only rms interested in innovating eectively and purposefully report barriers and perform innovative activities. In fact, the literature consistently shows that only when the relevant sample of rms that are interested in innovation are considered, a negative relationship between innovation and barriers emerges (e.g. Savignac, 2008; Pellegrino and Savona, 2017; Álvarez and Crespi, 2015) . Our data shows the same pattern.
Finally, all results presented in the paper use linear models, even though some dependent variables are binary or censored. We focus on linear models due to their robustness and the fact that they do not require any distributional assumption on the unobserved. They also allow for more exibility, for instance using rm level xed eects without the incidental parameters problem. 
Pooled innovation surveys
First, we present results for a linear model pooling the three innovation surveys (waves seven to nine), where we regress a variety of outcomes on dummies for the six categories of barriers, and some basic controls (survey and sector dummies, an exporting dummy, log employment and rm age), as shown in Equation 1.
Where y i,t is a measure of innovation inputs or outputs, λ t represents time dummies, λ r the region dummies, λ s the sector dummies, x i,t is a vector including the barrier dummies for rm i in year t and z i,t is a vector of rm-level controls. We are interested in the vector β, with the coecients that represent the relationship between the barriers and the outcomes. All of the regressions use the surveys' sampling weights. 14 Standard errors are clustered at the sector-region level. Tables 8 and 9 present results for innovation inputs and outputs. The left panel in each table shows the results using the full sample, and the right panel restricting it to potentially innovative rms (the relevant sample). For inputs, we analyze an R&D expenditure dummy, 15 a dummy for (non-R&D) spending on innovation, and a measure of its intensity, the (log) expenditure on innovation per employee. For innovation 11 We also estimated the specications of this section, expanding the group of potentially innovative rms, including also medium perception of obstacles. Results are very similar.
12 Unreported results using nonlinear models (i.e. Probit and Heckman models, depending on the variables) produce essentially the same results.
13 The denition of each innovation barrier dummy and covariates can be found in Appendix A. 14 These weights are required for the estimates to be consistent for the population regression function, given that the sample is not random (see Angrist and Pischke [2008] for an econometric justication and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas [2015] for the sampling methodology used for the survey).
15 R&D is not included in the innovation expenditure variable because this type of expenditure was asked in dierent ways in each survey wave. For this reason it was impossible to include the R&D expenditure level consistently through the three waves analyzed. outputs we look at any type of innovation and disaggregate it by technological and non-technological innovation. Only the coecients for the dummies indicating if a rm observed a barrier (nancial, knowledge, market, regulatory, demand and cooperation barriers) are reported. Table 8 examines inputs to the innovation process: the propensity to invest in innovation activities, the propensity to invest in R&D, as well as the intensity of investment in innovation activities.
The rst thing that becomes apparent is that when estimating using the full sample, around half of the estimated coecients show a positive relationship between barriers and innovation, and some of them are signicant. However, when we restrict the sample to potentially innovative rms, all coecients become negative and many are signicant. This is fully consistent with the received literature and conrms that this pattern, which had been described for nancial barriers in Chile by Álvarez and Crespi (2015) , also holds for every other obstacle category. As reported in the last row, in all cases the barriers are jointly signicant, except for innovation expenditure intensity.
For the binary variable indicating whether a rm conducts R&D, knowledge and market barriers are signicantly negative, with similar magnitudes. It is interesting that knowledge appears to be relevant only for the propensity to invest in R&D, and not for the propensity to invest in other innovation activities. This makes sense since more advanced knowledge is required for R&D than for other innovation expenditures, and this knowledge is more dicult to get access to. For a dummy indicating that a rm incurs non-R&D innovation expenditures, the estimates are signicantly negative for nancial, market and demand barriers.
Financial barriers show the largest coecients, followed closely by demand obstacles. When comparing the coecients of R&D to non-R&D expenditure dummies, the latter are larger than the former, something explained at least in part by the lower propensity to spend on R&D (around 12% of the rms, vis-à-vis 26% for non-R&D innovative expenditures), meaning that in relative terms the impact is comparable on both propensities. As for the intensity of innovation expenditures (conditional on spending), only knowledge barriers are signicant, suggesting that once a rm decided to spend on these activities, the only barrier that matters to determine the intensity of expenditure is whether they have the knowledge required for the issues at hand.
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There is no clear pattern for the relationship between barriers and innovation inputs, however, it is interesting to note that for the decision to invest in innovative activities (which for the Chilean case is much more prevalent than R&D expenditure), demand barriers matter just as much as nancial ones. The relevance of nancial barriers could be expected, given that they are directly connected with expenditure. But the fact that demand obstacles are just as important is an interesting nding and suggests that rms that face uncertain demand change their innovation investment decisions, which happen way before the moment they actually have to go to the market. This result is consistent with the ndings by Pellegrino and Savona (2017) with United Kingdom data. Table 9 shows the results for the relationship between innovation outputs and obstacles. As for the inputs, and consistent with the literature, coecient estimates change signs when the relevant sample is used. For the three innovation categories, only three obstacles seem to be relevant: nancial, demand and market structure conditions. In other words, money requirements to produce the innovation, demand to buy it, and a market with relatively low entry costs. In terms of signicance, results are similar for the three outcomes, but the coecients are larger for technological than for non-technological innovation. Financial barriers have the highest impact on the propensity to innovate (between 7 and 13 percentage points), followed by demand barriers (between 8 and 10 percentage points). The next in magnitude are market barriers, with similar coecients to demand obstacles, albeit slightly smaller.
Summarizing, restricting the sample to potentially innovative rms eliminates positive coecients for all barriers, turning them negative and signicant in some cases for innovation inputs and innovation outputs.
For innovation outputs, nancial, demand and market obstacles appear to be the most important. For innovation inputs, knowledge obstacles appear to be important, which is interesting because it is expected that capabilities are mostly required in the investment phase of a new product, service or process.
Instrumental variables
Firms that engage in innovation activities are the ones that experience actual problems in the process of investing, improving, and producing innovation. Thus, innovation eorts and the observation of barriers happen simultaneously. In order to assess the possibility that the previous estimations were aected by endogeneity, we provide estimations using instrumental variables.
For our denition of instrumental variables we adapted their use in papers that analyze the determinants of cooperation for innovation. In particular, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Chun and Mun (2012) .
These papers use industry averages as instruments for individual rm dummies of the use of dierent sources of information to innovate.
We propose a denition of instrumental variables using averages of each of the obstacle variables over region-sector-survey groups. With this we pretend to capture the exogenous component of these barriers, determined by market/demand and technology characteristics, which one can argue vary by sector, geographical location and time, but which have common traits within each group. We assume that each of these averages picks up the eects of unobserved industry-specic attributes that contribute to that endogenous rm-specic variable (instrumental variable relevance condition). This approach also assumes that the average perception of obstacles of the rms in the region-sector-survey will not inuence the decision to innovate or spend on innovation of a given rm beyond its eect through the barrier, and that individual rms do not inuence regional-sectoral-survey averages (the exogeneity condition). 17 Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) use as individual measures a rescaled (0-1) of the mean scores of severity of each obstacle category, and thus simply calculate the average across each industry. Since our measure of obstacles is activated if any obstacle in that category has a high perception, we calculate averages to construct instruments as the sector-region-survey averages of each obstacle category dummy. However, we also follow the paper's methodology and build a second instrument using the average intensity with which each obstacle is perceived over the sector-regionsurvey, ranging from zero (not important) to three (very important). 18 Finally, since we use sampling weights in our estimations, we calculated these averages using the corresponding weights, and considering only the sample of potentially innovative rms. The formal denition of the dummy instrument is: Where int k i,s,r,t captures the intensity (between 0 and 3, 0 being not relevant and 3 being very relevant)
with which barrier k is declared as an obstacle by rm i in sector s in region r at time t, where k can be each of the six types of obstacles.
We present results for the probability of innovating and for the probability of spending on innovation (the only innovation input variable with strong results in pooled cross section estimates). Tables 10 and 11 compare non-instrumented results for the whole sample and potentially innovative rms (from Tables 9 and   8) , with instrumental variables estimates using each of the sets of instruments dened above. Table 10 shows results for the probability of innovating in any type of innovation. When instrumenting, only the nancial and demand obstacles remain signicant, and both coecients increase in size, both having a larger negative impact on the probability of innovating. The instruments do not appear to be weak, as shown by the F tests reported. Comparing both instrumental variables regressions, depending on the instrument we use, we observe that either demand obstacles (using intensity averages) or nancial obstacles (using dummy averages of high importance) appear to have the highest impact. We do not have enough evidence to support one over another with these regressions, but this gives us evidence that both issues are clearly the most important issues deterring rms from innovating.
Market structure barriers, which are strongly signicant for innovation outcomes in the original regressions, are not signicant anymore. Table 11 shows comparative results for the probability of spending on innovation. Again the instrumental variables estimates show that nancial and demand obstacles are signicant and have larger magnitudes than before, but only when instrumenting using the dummy averages. When using intensity averages as instruments, no obstacles are signicant.
Heterogeneity
In the descriptive section, we showed that there appears to be an important degree of sectoral heterogeneity in innovativeness, and in the perception of obstacles. Primary sectors like mining, and services, like utilities and nancial services, have the lowest perception of obstacles and some of the highest propensities to innovate.
On the other hand, shing and wholesale and retail trade are on the opposite end in both respects. We want to nd evidence on whether the relationships found in the previous sections are driven by these sectors or others. Also, since nancial and demand barriers appear to be the most pervasive, we present some evidence on how the relationship between obtacles and innovation variables changes when nancial or demand barriers are present or absent.
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19 All results presented here are based on the pooled cross section of innovation surveys and on the sample of potentially innovative rms. Notes. Innovation survey data, waves 7, 8 and 9. Firm level instrumental variables regressions controlling for survey, region and sector dummies, exporter dummy, rm age and log employment. Standard errors clustered at the region-sector level. Barrier dummies are instrumented by the average of each barrier over the rm's sector-region-survey (dummy instrument), or by a measure of intensity of the barrier over the rm's sector-region-survey (intensity instrument). Intensity goes from 0 (irrelevant) to 3 (high importance) and is averaged over all questions classied under each category. p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes. Innovation survey data, waves 7, 8 and 9. Firm level instrumental variables regressions controlling for survey, region and sector dummies, exporter dummy, rm age and log employment. Standard errors clustered at the region-sector level. Barrier dummies are instrumented by the average of each barrier over the rm's sector-region-survey (dummy instrument), or by a measure of intensity of the barrier over the rm's sector-region-survey (intensity instrument). Intensity goes from 0 (irrelevant) to 3 (high importance) and is averaged over all questions classied under each category. p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Dierences across sectors
We disaggregate our sample in four sectors: 20 non-mining primaries, mining, 21 manufacturing and services.
Due to the nature of our instrument, we cannot use it for some of the sectors, so results in this section are based on simple OLS estimates. We focus on the dummies for innovation and for expenditure on innovation as dependent variables. Table 12 shows the results for innovation outcomes (any innovation). The non-mining primary sector innovation seems to be inuenced only by nancial obstacles. In the case of mining, nancial obstacles (with double the impact compared with the rest of the primary sector) and demand obstacles have an important and similar impact, reducing the probability of innovation by up to 40 percentage points. In manufacturing again, nance and demand have the highest negative impact (15 and 10 percentage points, respectively), but also knowledge barriers appear relevant in this sector. Finally, for the services sector, again nance and demand are the most important obstacles, with coecients of -0.10, although market structure obstacles also have a signicant negative impact, with a similar coecient. In sum, nance and demand matter across the board, while market barriers are only relevant for services and knowledge barriers for
manufacturing.
Next, we analyze results for innovation inputs. The results for the probability of spending on innovation, seen in Table 13 , are very similar to those of the probability of generating innovation outputs, with the important dierence that now demand barriers are also relevant for the primary (non-mining) sector. The obstacles that appear signicant are the same and the coecients are very similar too.
Summarizing, the coecients we observe in Table 9 for innovation outputs, particularly for demand and nance obstacles are not driven by any sector in particular. In three of the four sectors we analyzed, both demand and nance appear to be signicant, although in mining the coecients appear particularly large.
The only exception is agriculture and shing, where the coecient for demand is almost signicant at 10%.
It is interesting that although mining has the highest rate of innovation and the lowest propensity to declare obstacles, as seen in Table 6 , it faces the highest impact of some of those obstacles on innovation. As for the signicant coecient we observe for market structure obstacles, it seems to be driven by the services sector, although it is not signicant when instrumenting. Finally, only in manufacturing do we observe knowledge obstacles being relevant, but this is not observed when we estimate using the whole sample. Appendix B presents the same regressions but without aggregating ISIC sections.
We discuss the policy implications of these results later on.
Heterogeneity in obstacles: removing barriers
We want to take the analysis of these barriers one step further, analyzing what happens with the rest of the perceived obstacles under the presence or absence of the most important barriers. Tables 14, 15 and 16 show this from dierent perspectives. Table 14 divides the sample between the rms that experience nancial obstacles and those which do not. We look at the relevance of the rest of the obstacles for each group.
Interestingly, when rms do not face nancial obstacles, the eect of the rest of the obstacles is amplied. This is true both for innovation inputs and outputs. Demand obstacles have clearly the largest impact. When introducing a new product or process, also knowledge, market and cooperation obstacles become signicant, when rms face no important nancial obstacles. However, when nancial obstacles are active (right panel), 20 Each represents one or several rst-level ISIC Sections. 21 We separated mining because it is by far the most important export and because it has the highest rate of innovation and the lowest perception of obstacles. most of the coecients that were signicant become insignicant or reduce their magnitude. Most notably, demand obstacles become insignicant for the three dependent variables. Out of the four barriers that were negative and signicant for innovation outputs when there were no nancial barriers, only market obstacles remain signicant. Regulatory obstacles appear relevant and were not before, and knowledge barriers have a puzzling positive coecient. For the expenditure variables, all estimates become relatively small. In other words, when rms face nancial barriers, not much else seems to matter, notably not demand. But when they lift them, it is only then that other obstacles, especially demand (and others which were not signicant before) appear. Table 15 shows how active obstacles appear to be in the presence or absence of demand obstacles. When demand obstacles are not active, nance appears to be the strongest deterrent to innovation, together with market structure and cooperation. For the probability of spending on innovation activities, results are very similar, with coecients being a little smaller. Finally for spending on R&D, knowledge barriers are also signicant, something that could be explained by the fact that R&D activities are in general more knowledge intensive than other innovation activities. However, when demand obstacles become active we observe that, besides regulatory obstacles, all barriersincluding nancial onesbecome insignicant. One interpretation of this could be that demand obstacles dominate other ones, where in the presence of it, the other obstacles become irrelevant.
Finally, Table 16 shows the results when neither demand nor nancial obstacles are active (left panel).
This again increases the signicance and the magnitude of the coecients of the impact of the remaining obstacles when they are present (only regulatory obstacles remain insignicant). When either demand and/or nance obstacles are present, the other key obstacle becomes insignicant (except for one weakly positive coecient). It is interesting to note that throughout the three exercises the other key obstacle is never signicant when the other obstacle is active. The rest of the obstacles either loose signicance or become smaller. an F-test of the joint signicance of the barrier dummies. p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
These tables conrm the relevance of nancial and demand obstacles. They seem to dominate others and, when present, they seem binding and decrease the relevance of other obstacles, making the other key obstacle (demand if nance active or nance when demand is active) insignicant, reducing generally the signicance and size of the coecients of the rest of the obstacles. When neither are active, market, knowledge and cooperation become negative and signicant.
Fixed-eects regressions for available panels
In this section we use a small balanced panel we built from the three innovation surveys with the help of the Ministry of Economics and INE to control for rm-level xed eects to check the robustness of our results.
We use the subsample of innovation survey respondents that were surveyed for the innovation survey waves 7, 8 and 9. As explained in Section 2, this panel is not representative of the population of rms, as it is biased towards large rms and some sectors, such as mining and manufacturing, which are overrepresented, leaving most of the services sector underrepresented. Tables 17 and 18 replicate Tables 9 and 8 , respectively, with the sole dierences of controlling for rm xed eects instead of sector xed eects, and clustering the standard errors at the rm level.
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As in Tables 8 and 9 , most estimates change signs when restricting the sample. However, the only obstacles that remain signicant when using xed eects are, just like under instrumental variables estimation, demand and nancial obstacles, only at the 10% level, and with very similar coecients to each other. When we decompose the innovation propensity into technological and non-technological innovation, demand obstacles 22 With this panel we cannot use survey weights. This means that the estimates are not comparable to those in the previous sections. are the only signicant determinants for technological innovation, but no obstacles appear signicant for non-technological innovation.
Looking at Table 18 , with the results for innovation inputs as regression outcomes, demand barriers again stand out, being strongly signicant for the non-R&D innovation expenditure dummy. It is also signicant at the 5% level for the intensity of innovation expenditure, conditional on strictly positive spending.
23
In a puzzling result, market barriers are positive and signicant. This might be related to higher spending on sectors with concentrated markets.
Overall, results with the limited panel sample that is available conrm the importance of demand barriers, which, together with nancial obstacles, stood out as the most important barrier under instrumental variables estimation.
Demand obstacles and information about demand
A relevant question when analyzing demand obstacles is if this obstacle reects eective lack of demand or lack of information about demand. One way of analyzing this issue is looking at whether rms that declare demand obstacles look for ways to overcome them. One way of doing this is acquiring information. This suggests that they tend to declare obstacles knowing if there is or is not demand. However, if true, the causality and underlying explanation of this could go in dierent directions.
One possibility is that rms that believe there could be no demand for their products have a higher incentive to look for information from clients or competitors. But it could also be the opposite. Firms that look for information might have a higher chance of verifying that there are actual demand problems. This is a natural area for further research to understand the underpinnings of these obstacles and how rms cope with them.
Discussion
Demand obstacles could be related to nal consumers or to intermediate consumption by other rms that could buy innovations for their production processes. 24 Most of the rms that we interviewed in our complementary qualitative analysis are business-to-busines companies and argue that actual and potential clients seem very reluctant to even test new products, particularly if they have incurred large sunk costs to make current production processes work. Knowing that your customers are conservative in their buying decisions, particularly for untested products, could deter innovation from the beginning of the process. This could explain why we nd in our paper that demand obstacles are signicant for innovation inputs as well as outputs.
From a buyer's perspective, the existence of technical risk when making changes in the productive processes is a fact, and from the perspective of the innovative supplier, it can be observed as a demand risk. Also, in some areas, where there is a dominant leader, many rms appear to wait for the leaders to adopt new technologies rst, something that could be related to the signicance of market structure barriers and how they could compound demand uncertainty.
There are other demand-related issues that were described as cultural problems by our interviewees: low degrees of condence in the quality of innovative domestic suppliers; a tendency to value foreign alternatives as better regardless of actual quality; rms' short-sightedness and focus on short-term outcomes, which results in a lack of interest on the part of large rms in building long-term, win-win relationships with innovative suppliers; and a general attitude of larger rms to take advantage of their bargaining power vis-à-vis smalland medium-sized suppliers. It is interesting to relate these ndings to the description of the issues faced by 24 According to the National Accounts, intermediate consumption accounts for roughly half of Chilean GDP.
the Korean machine tools industry during its catch-up process, as described in Kim and Lee (2008) . They argue that one of the main problems that small and mid-sized domestic rms had to face was uncertain or unfair demand from user rms. They describe issues like a wait and see attitude towards using domestic products; a priori preference for foreign inputs; and requesting price discounts from domestic suppliers, even if their quality did not justify it. Even though Kim and Lee (2008) refer to the development of a specic and R&D intensive sector (machine tools), the similarities between the issues faced by those small and mid sized rms and by similar sized Chilean innovative rms that try to sell to large domestic rms are striking.
While to an extent some characteristics of the Chilean culture might worsen these issues, the similarities between what has been observed in both countries suggest that these are more general, structural problems faced by smaller rms that try to sell to other rms in developing or middle income countries, where there is no tradition of domestic or innovative suppliers, and purchasing power is often concentrated in large conglomerates, which give them an upper hand in negotiations. For example, short-sightedness could be the result of limited management capabilities in developing countries (see Van Reenen 2007, 2010, and the related literature). 25 If this was the case, demand barriers should be less important in countries with better management practices. In fact, while we nd very similar eects for nancial and demand barriers, a closely related paper on a developed country (Pellegrino and Savona, 2017) nds that the coecients for demand barriers are smaller than those for nancial barriers. 26 The uncertainty about the quality of domestic suppliers in the Korean case and of innovative products in the Chilean case could be the result of non-existent previous experience and reputation. As stressed by Foster et al. (2016) , rms must go through a demand accumulation process where they build a customer base. This might create a vicious cycle of no demand because of not having a reputation, while a reputation cannot be built without having demand.
Financial barriers, although important, are fundamentally dierent from demand barriers: rms have more control over them. They can look for funds, join forces with other rms, and apply for public funds, of which rms in general have a positive opinion. It is much more dicult for them to get other rms to purchase their products or to collaborate with them to develop a new solution. Regarding cooperation with other rms, this was repeatedly mentioned as a solution not only to nancial barriers, but also to knowledge and demand problems. Pooling dierent kinds of resources and working together with other rms is an important way to overcome barriers and innovate eectively.
Conclusions
This paper provides an in-depth empirical analysis of the negative eects of dierent obstacles to innovation activities in a middle income economy. Easing or removing obstacles might be necessary to unleash innovation at the rm level, particularly in countries like Chile, where levels of innovation and R&D are low despite subsidies promoting innovation having been in place for a long time.
We use an instrumental variables approach, as well as a small panel and xed eects estimation, and nd a strong and consistently large negative impact of demand and nancial obstacles on innovation inputs (propensities to spend) and especially on innovation outputs (actual innovations). Particularly, lack of demand and uncertainty about it are pervasive enough as to aect not only the probability of introducing 25 Policies to support rms' innovation management capabilities have been in place for several years. The problem of excessive focus on short-run outcomes however might be more general: rms need good management capabilities for their core processes before thinking about developing capabilities to manage innovation.
26 Although, at least in one specication, this dierence is not signicant, the dierence between the coecients is important and consistent across specications.
new products or services to the market, but the actual decision to invest in innovation. The signicance of these relationships seems robust.
Depending on the instrument used, demand obstacles lower the probability of innovating by between 15 and 28 percentage points, and nancial obstacles lower it between 17 and 23 percentage points. The eect of demand and nancial barriers on the propensity to spend on (non-R&D) innovation activities are 13 and 15 percentage points, respectively. Considering the group of potentially innovative rms, this means that nancial or demand barriers roughly halve the propensities to innovate or to spend on innovation.
Analyzing the primary sector, manufacturing and services separately, the coecients for demand and nancial obstacles are signicant across the board, reinforcing the importance of these categories of barriers.
The role played by nancial and demand obstacles can also be observed when restricting estimations to rms that do or do not face them. When rms declare nancial or demand obstacles, all other barriers tend to become insignicant. When they are absent, the signicance of other obstaclesmost of them insignicant for the whole sampleincreases, suggesting that these two types of barriers are binding and only after lifting them might other obstacles become relevant.
We also nd some sectorial heterogeneity. Knowledge barriers are signicant for manufacturing for both inputs and outputs of innovation. The relevance of market structure obstacles, which appear signicant in the non-instrumented full sample estimations, seems to be driven by the services sector.
The ndings of this paper have important policy implications. Most policy instruments in Chile and
Latin America correspond to nancial support through matching grants or tax breaks, addressing and giving implicitly special importance to nancial constraints for innovation as the main problem rms face. The relevance of demand obstacles points to an avenue of interesting and potentially complementary policies that could enhance innovation. One obvious alternative, which has received certain academic attention, is the role of public procurement policies for innovation (see for instance Georghiou, 2007, or Uyarra et al., 2014) . Alternatively, insurance provided by a development bank (i.e. solving a missing market issue) could reduce the risk of testing new products for buyers.
Second, the fact that we nd that some obstacles are important for all sectors (demand and nance) and others only for specic ones (knowledge and market structure) points to policies that should be horizontal for the former and vertical for the latter. More research is needed to clarify these dierences, but in principle, for example, policymakers could tackle potential problems of human capital that might reduce innovation in the manufacturing sector. Second, we need to dig deeper in the complementarity of obstacles. This has been advanced by papers like Galia and Legros (2004) , but it is necessary to further understand how the presence or absence of particularly pervasive obstacles aect not only innovation itself, but the perception of other obstacles and their eects on innovation. Finally, the dynamics of these relations and the role of government policies in altering them is a natural avenue for future research. We were unable to exploit this in this paper due to the limitations of the panel, but disentangling these interactions through time can shed light on how policies should be implemented to be more eective in addressing these obstacles, as well as on questions related to the strategies used by rms to overcome barriers to innovation. The tables below present the same regressions discussed in the main text, but using the original ISIC sections, without aggregating them in broad sectors.
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The signicance of the estimates should be interpreted carefully because of the dierences in sample sizes. 
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Continuous
See the list of barriers in Table   3 in the main text. Determinants of technological innovation dummy by sector, only potentially innovative rms.
Controlling for survey dummies, region dummies, exporter dummy, rm age and log employment.
Robust standard errors (not enough clusters for valid cluster-robust inference). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Determinants of innovation dummy by sector, only potentially innovative rms.
Robust standard errors (not enough clusters for valid cluster-robust inference). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
